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SlJPREIE oomtT 07 Al'PI&LS OF VDGIIU 
A't !tlCBIOIJJ) .. 
r • A. ROBBR!SOI 
A copy or tbe Re~ !riet or the Plalrlt.Ut .in Error waa 
lett with counsel tor the Commonwealth ~ the at\emoon of Haroh a. 
Counsel for the Coramonne.l tb wr1sbes briefl7 to coaent Oil the same. 
Oa paae a thereot, oouuel tor the pla1D.t1tt iD. error 
state a a 
. •I have been unable to find anJ caae deal.iD& with 
ice creaa. * * •• 
We w1ah to oaU the a\ten\ioa of the CIGtU"tt to the case ot 
Lerma v. Distrus; et CoJ.gWI, 55 led. (2d) 1020. In that case a 
statute (Code ot the Distr1ot ot Col.Wilbla, Title 10, aeotioaa 12il•1251) 
entitled "An Act to repl&te within the Diatrlot. ot Oolwab1a the sale ot 
milk.t oreaa, and toe onam, and tor other ~poaea• waa uncl.ar consideratioa. 
Sectioa 2 thereot provideea 
"'o peJ'Hil ah&U • * * aeDd iato a&1d Diatriot 
tor aale, UJ:tldlt, OHU1 or 1oe oreaa ·without a pemtt ao 
to do troa the health ottioer ot said Diav1ot• and \baa 
oa1l' ill accordanoe with the teru ot aald pealt.• 
The Aot preau1bea tllt.t. appl1oa.t1ou tor parmi t; sh&ll be made 
in wr11Wlg and aat be &O'Hd UJIOD 1:r the heal~ ottioer wlthiD t.blr\7 
dqa. At that U.. he makea the neoea1a17 lnapeot1oaa, eto., There is 110 
provia1n tor noUoe Mtore ara &SJplioa\loa tor a pe1'111t 1a refuec:t. The 
health ottloer 1a esaponnd to suapend auoh peralta. 
Irt that case 110 applloe.\lon had 'been ll8de tor 4etcmdaat. 
appu-eDtq bad been convlo'W ia the police oourt ot the District of Coluabia1 
as the oa•• or181Dated then. The a~ hol4 that 1ihe statute was DOt 
1.1l1reaaODable, oppressive or a'bnrd. 
The oou.rtt a a'btea•ioa 1a illv1ted \0 the above case, as the 
statute under conaWeraUoa and 'he oirO\llliRuoea or ·'he aaee were verr 
simUar to the caae at bar. Thia oaae Ulu.s\ratea tha.t the publio a.-
thorit1es eltewhere bave enaotea ei•l1ar e\a~te• preaorib1ng tbe regulat1Ga, 
aale and JB&Dtlf'aeture of 1oe ereaa as health mea81U'ea. 
Wo believe that the oaae ot 'F.UA\ v. Qt!'l 1 Rt 219 U. s. 128, 
would be ot &0118 '98l.ue to the oour\e 
Oa paae 7 of said Repl7 !rief', we t1D4 tbia stateuata 
.. • * I wan\ to appeal to tb1a Court tbat this 1a 
the ODl7 Act 1n V1rain1a, ot wh1oh I am aware that has ever 
uadertakea to sr&Dt a licenee to engage in & legitimate baaiD818t 
«1thout attordlng "he appl1oaat aome k1Dd of hearilll•" 
In the f•UniD&' latta whloh are e.dalDishnd tv the Da1J7 aDd 
Food D1v1aion, De,artment of· Acrioulture and Ia' pation, licensee or per-
lilts are required tor the busineaeea atfeo'hd, but aone of these lawa 
reqd.rea notioea before a license oaa be refued or revoked. lo arbitrar.r 
or oaprioioua powuo are crant.d, aD4 1\ 1a ueoeaaarr merelf t.o c011Pl7 with 
aerta1a clearlJ stated cond1t1ona tD o~er to receive or to hold a lioenaea 
Liceue to operate the Babcock Teat (sections 1201 to 
12141 1nolua1ve, or \he OodeJ obapter 417, Acta ot 1911) • 
LicaeDee to open.te alauabt.er hOWiea ( seot10111 1211 aa4 
lUI ot tbe OocleJ obaptar 60, Aata ot 1916, and ohapt.er 
179, Aota ot 1911). · 
L1cenae to operate oold •toras• nrehouea ( aect1oaa 
1218& to 1U8o ot the CodeJ chapter u, Acts ot 19181 
and obapter 11, Acta at 1911). 
Lioenae tor each brand ot CoDdiaeDtal St.ook Powdere 
8014 (aeotlou 1141 to 11491 1Dclus1ve, ot the CodeJ chapter 
588, Aota of 1922). 
Pend.t tor sale ot ll1lk anti creaa (chapter 15&, Aeta ot 
19M). 
Lioeue to opera'M onuaerlea and Jll1lk atatina (ohap'Mr 
4011 AC\1 of 1118), . . 
The a-t.tentS.cm ot the court 11 invited \o '\beae Aots as 11U1J 
or tbera are similar to the statute under oonaldeJ'&tioa and have beea on 
the statute booke tor maJG' r~e, aD4 tlle MilDer ill which they have been 
a.dta1niatared have 101'11 been auotlouci b.Y publio uae. 
Abraa P. .Staples, 
A ttorner Goneral. 
D. Garct1ner T7ler, Jr., 
Aaaia\au.t A tto=er General. 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of ApPeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1848 
F. A. ROBERTSON 
versus 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDE!l-8. 
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and .Associate Justices 
of the Suprerne Court of .Appeals of Virginia.: 
Your petitioner, F. A. Robertson, respectfully represents 
that he is greatly ag·g·rieved by a judgment of the Corpora-
tion Court for the City of Lynchburg, entered on the 2nd 
day of November, 1936, against him, :finding him guilty of 
manufacturing ice cream, without a permit, in violation of 
Section 1215 of the Code of Virginia (Chapter 391, Aets of 
Assembly, 1934), and :fL'"{ing his punishment at a fine of Ten 
Dollars and costs. A duly authenticated transcript of the 
record is hereto attached and it is prayed that the same may 
be read and treated as a part of this petition. 
THE CHARGE AGAINST PETITIONER. 
The charge originated against petitioner (hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendant), in the Municipal Court of the City 
of Lynchburg, on a warrant which charged that the defend-
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ant, "dtid in said ·City, on the . , .. day of September, 1936, 
~tnlawfully manufacture ice cream, withou,t a permit in vio-
lation of Section 1215 of the Code of Virginia, Acts of As-
, smnbly, 1934". Upon conviction by the Judge of the Muni-
cipal Court, he prayecl for and was allowed an appeal to 
the Corporation Col1rt, which likewise found him guilty and 
imposed a fine of Te11 Dollars. , . 
THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
WAS CONVICTED. 
Since the defendant contends that the statute, under which 
he was convicted, is plainly unconstitutional, and void, it is 
deemed appropriate to set forth the pertinent sections of the 
statute. The pertinent provisions are as follo\vs: 
§1215-" Permits-(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, 
firm, association or corporation to manufacture in the State 
of Virginia,- or bring into or receive in the State of Virginia, 
for sale or to sell or offer for sale therein, or to distribute 
any ice cream or frozen· products as defined in this act who 
does not possess an unrevoked permit from the Commissioner 
of Agriculture and Immigration issued by the Director ot 
. the Dairy and Food. Such permits may be suspended or re-
voked upon the violation of any of the terms of this act by 
authority of the Commissioner of ·Agriculture and Immigra-
tion acting through the Director of the- Division of Dairy 
and Food. Application .for permit shall be made in writ-
ing to the Director of Division of Dairy and. Food of the 
Department of Agriculture and Immigration." 
STATEMENT O:B., THE ·CAS.E. 
From the transcript of the record, it will appear that the 
Commonwealth and the defendant both waived trial by jury 
and submitted all questions of law a.nd fact to the Court (Or-
der, R., p. 49). The facts, out of which this controversy 
.arose, may be briefly summarized as follows : 
... 
F. A. Robertson, a resident of Lynchburg, was and is, 
the owner of a drug store, by the name of Westover Phar-
macy, located in Lynchburg. Shortly after opening his drug 
store, he purchased what is referred to in the evidence, as a 
''counter freezer", an electric freezer, designed for freezing· 
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ice cream. The countei· freezer is of recent origin, having 
been placed on the market about six years ago, and having 
come into popular vogue, during the past three years (R., 
p. 45). The counter freezer, as its name implies, and as the 
photograph used in the trial court and here certified as an 
original exhibit shows, is intended for use along· the counter. 
(See photograph filed with manuscript in clerk's office.) 
It might not be amiss, at this point, to acquaint the Court 
with the operation of the counter freezer, as disclosed in the 
evidence. 
Robertson purchased, from the Pet Milk ·Company, of 
Abingdon, Virginia, a prepared ''mix", as it is referred to in 
the evidence. It is undisputed that the mix from which 
the ice cream is made, comes in sanitary containers and is 
sanitary in every essential particular. This fact is admitted 
by every witness, both for the Commonwealth and for the 
defendant (R., pp. 13, 28). Upon obtaining the mix, it is 
poured from a ten gallon, sealed container, into smaller 
containers, which are put in storage boxes (R., pp. 28-29). 
From there, generally, some flavoring is added and the mix is 
put into the counter freezer. One other fact is undisputed. 
The counter freezer is air-tight and once the mix gets into it, 
it is free from any possible contamination, while it is in the 
freezer. After it is frozen it is taken out and retailed to the 
public. 
The evidence shows that Robertson opened his drug store, 
on or about the 3rd day of September, 1936. The evidence 
shows, without conflict (R., p. 26), that prior to opening the 
Westover Pharmacy he applied to the Director .of Dairy and · 
Food, Department of Agriculture and Immigration, for a 
permit, under the act in question. Shortly thereafter, In-
spector E. L. Carlyle came to his place of business (R., p. 
27.). Several days after his visit, he received a letter, advis-
ing hin1 that a permit had been refused. He never rece?.'l'ed 
anlJ notice and no oppo'rtunity was accorded hi1n to be heard 
on his fitness or u1~jitness for a permit. In other 'WOrds, the. 
board acted entirely on the recommendation of Carlyle, with-
m6t ever gi'l.Jin_q Robertson any notice or affording him any 
opport'ltnity to be hea'rd. He continued to freez~ ice cream 
at his drug store and the prosecution under consideration re-
sulted. A warrant was sworn out a.gainst him and he was 
placed on trial in the Municipal Court of·the City of Lynch-
burg, which resulted in conviction. On an appeal to the Cor-. 
poration Court for the City of Lynchburg, he was, on N ovem-
ber 2, 1936, convicted, and his punishment :fixed at a fine of 
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Ten Dollars. It is from this judgment of conviction, which 
he now petitions this Honorable Court for a writ of error 
and supersedeas. 
There are other pertinent facts, which have a material 
bearing on the outcome of this prosecution. It is believed 
that they more appropriately belong at the points in the peti-
tion, where the argument is based upon them and they will, 
therefore, fully appear, infra. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The defendant assigns as error, the action of the Court in 
entering up a judgment of conviction against him on the 
ground that the same is contrary to the law and the evidence 
for the following reasons, to-wit: 
1. The act of the Legislature in question (Sec. 1215 of the 
Code of ·Virginia, Acts of Assembly, Chapter 391, 1934,) is 
plainly unconstitutional and void, for the following reasons: 
A. It vests in an administrative head unlimited and un-
controlled discretion to grant or refuse a permit, to engage 
in a legitimate business, 1.vithout affording to the applica.nt1 
notice, or an opportunity to be heard and is therefore in 
violation of Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, and 
the 14th Amendment to the Federal Oonstitution, in that it 
deprives the party rejected of property, 'vithout due process 
of law. 
B. The act in question is unconstitutional and void, in that 
it grants an absolute, uncontrolled discretion to the Director 
of the Division of Dairy and Food, who may grant or refuse 
permits provided for under. the act, at will. 
2. Even if the act be held to be constitutional, it is wholly 
inapplicable to the defendant and no permit should have 
been required of him, to engage in freezing ice cream and 
for that reason, the judgment of the Court is without evi-
dence to support it. 
These were the contentions made, without success in the 
trial court and are reiterated here. In the arg1lnl.ent that 
follows, they will be examined and treated ser·iatim. 
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ARGUJ\tiENT. 
THE ACT IS PLAINLY IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITU-
TION AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The defendant, upon opening his drug store, applied, in 
writing, under the act, for a permit, to the Director of the Di-
vision of Dairy and :B,ood of the Department of Ag·riculture 
and Immigration. Subsequent thereto, Inspector Carlyle ap-
peared at his store, n1ade an investigation and he was there-
after advised that no permit would be granted and none -has 
been granted. It will be observed that the section referred 
to requires an unrevoked permit, from the Commissioner of 
.Agriculture and Immigration, issued by the Director of the 
Division of Dairy and Food, and then provides that such per-
mits may be su.spended or revoked, upon the violation of any 
of the tenns of this act, by authority of the Connnissioner 
of Agriculture and Immigration, acting through the Dir-ec-
tor of the Division of Dairy and Food. No provision is made 
with reference to n.Qtioe to the applicant nor is there contained 
in the act, a provision, affording him an opportunity to be· 
heard on the q'ltestion of his fitness for a permit. It is the 
contention of the defendant, if we may borro'v the lang1.1age 
of Chief Justice White, ''that to condemn, ,v:thout a hear-
ing is repugnant to the due process clause of the 14th amend-
ment, needs but statement". Riverside & Dan River Cotton 
Mills v. ll1enefee, 59 I..J. E-d. 910. . 
Before examining the authorities on the proposition, we 
desire to call the Court's attention to the fact that the policy 
of Virginia, as reflected by the cases, to 'vhich we refer, as 
well as the acts, is, in every instance, to afford an applicant 
for a license, notice and an opportunity to be heard. For 
example : The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act contains a 
provision that the applicant shall have notice, as well as a 
right to a hearing. The same is true of the Dry Cleaning Act 
(Acts of Assembly 1936, 011apter 335, p. 537); the same is 
true of the act, regulating embalmers and funeral direc-
tors (Acts of Assembly 1936, Chapter 127, p. 219). We :find 
the same provision in the Milk Commission Act (Acts of As-
sembly 1934, Chapter 357, p. 558). 
We submit, with confidence, that the law in Virginia, as 
well as elsewhere, speaks with one voice on the right of an 
individual engaged in a legitimate enterprise, to be heard on 
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his fitness for a perntit or license (the terms, generally be-
ing used interchangeably). 
It is our purpose to examine the pertinent Virginia cases 
and then point to authorities fron1 other states, on questions 
practically identical to the question in the case at bar. 
The leading case in ·virginia, and one of the leading cases in 
this Gountry is Thontpson v. Sn~ith, 155 Va. 367. Thompson 
appealed from a decree of the Corporation Court for the City 
of Lynchburg, dismissing a bill in chancery, which had ·for 
its object, enjoining the Chief of Police, Smith, from interfer-
ing with his operation of a private automobile on the streets of 
Lynchburg. The Ordinance in question gave the Chief of 
Police the right to revoke the license of a person to operate 
an automobile, under c,ertain conditions. Even in this cctse, 
there was an appeal to the Police Court Judge. 
, Attention is directed, in the opinion, to the section of the 
ordinance in question. 
''The exercise of such a con1mon right the city may, un-
der its police power, reg·ulate in the interest of the public 
safety and welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably 
prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it 
and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like 
conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. Taylo'r v. Smith, 
140 Va. 217, 124 S. E. 259; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 
85 S. E. 781, L. R. A. 1915-F, 840; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 
Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L. R. A. 1918-B, 909 Ann. Cas. 1918-
C 942. 
''It has been said that when the State or a city has the 
power to prohibit the doing· of an act altogether, it has the 
power to permit the doing of the act upon any condition, or 
subject to any regulations, however arbitrary or capricious 
it may be; and may lawfully delegate to executive or adminis-
trative officer an uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion as to 
granting and revoking permits or licenses to do such acts. 
Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S. E. 259, 263, State ex rel 
Cntmpton v. M orntgon~ery, 177 Ala. 221, 59- So. 294; State v. 
Gra.y, 61 Conn. 39, 22 Atl. 675. City of St. Joseph v. Leven, 
128 ~Io. 1588, 31 S. W. 101, 49 .Am. St. Rep. 577; Bro·wn v. 
Stubbs. 128 ~{d. 129, 97 ~t\tl. 227. 
''This doctrine has been pronounced most often in cases in-
volving the granting, refusing and revoking of licenses or 
permits to sell intoxicating liquors, or to do other things which 
because of their character are, or tend to he, injurious, as 
F. .A.· Robertso.n v. Commonwealth .. '1 
for instance keeping a gambling house or a bawdy-house, or 
operating a junk or pawn shop; and it has also been applied 
to cases involving permits or licenses to transport persons 
or property for hire along the streets. See Taylor v. Smith, 
supra, and cases there cited. But this doctrine has no appli-
cation ·to pennits issued for the p'l,rpose of regulating the ex-
ercise of the co1nmon right to operate a prit'ate a'lt:tomobile on, 
the streets of a city, in the usual and ordinary way, to. trans-
port the driver's person ancl property. 
''It is a j'ltnda1nental prinCiple of our system of government 
tha.t the rights of men are to be detennineil by the law itself, 
and not by the let or lea~'e or administrative officers or bu-
reaus. This principle ought not to be surrendered for con-
venience or in effect nullified for the sake of expediency. It 
is the prerogative, and function of the legislative branch of 
the government, 'vhether State or municipal, to determine 
and declare what the law shall be, and the legislative branch 
of the government may not divest itself of this function or 
delegate it to executive or administrative officers.'' (Italics 
supplied.) 
The Court held the Ordinance void. We invite the Court's 
particular attention to the case, 'vithout further quotation 
therefron1. 
In Fugate v. lV eston., 156 Va. 107, the Court was dealing 
with an original petition for mandamus, filed by one Fugate, 
in which he claimed that the Governor of Virginia had, under 
Section 366 bf the Tax Code, issued an executive order, re-
moving one Weston as Treasurer of Lee County, and sub-
stituting said Fugate, in his place. The question was on the 
authority of the Governor to remove Weston, without notice 
or hearing to him. Judge Holt said: 
''.Unless a Constitution provides otherwise, the right to no-
tice is universally recognized when a question essentially 
judicial is involved. It is as old as the common law and is 
reaffirmed in 1\tlag·na Charta, c. 29. In Ramshay's Ca.~e, 1& 
Q. B. 190, it is characterized as one of the 'implied condi-
tions prescribed by the principles of eternal justice'. It is 
a part of the law of the land, or of due process of law. Va. 
Const., ·sections 8, 11; Foster v. l(ansas, 112 U. S. 201, 5 S. 
Ct. 8, 97, 28 L. Ed. 629, 696; Shurtleff v.! United States, 1891 
U. S. 311, 23 S. Ct. 535, 47 L. Ed. 828; 46 C. J. 989; 22 R. 
C. L. 574. These last named authorities cite in support of 
their conclusions a cloud of cases. 
"In Underwood v. McVeigh, 23 Gratt. (64 Va.) 409, the court 
said: 'The authorities on this point are overwhelming, and 
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the decisions of all the tribunals of every country where an 
enlightened jurisprudence prevails are all one way. It lies 
at the very- foundation of justice, that every person who is 
to be affected by an adjudication should have the opportunity 
of being heard in defense, both in repelling the allegations of 
f~ct, and UPQn the matter of law; and no sentence of any 
court is entitled to the least respect in any other court, or 
elsewhere,· when it has been pronounced ex parte and without 
opportunity of defense.' '' 
See also Ward L'U,mber Co. v. Henderson-Wh-ite Mfg. ·Co., 
107 Va. 626; Commonwealth v. Hampton Roads Oyster Co., 
109 Va. 585; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310; Reynolds v. Milk 
Com·missioner, 163 Va.. 957. 
In the Bell case, our Virginia Court, when the question was 
then before it, said, with reference to the first provision, for 
notice and hearing to a potential idiot: 
''An. adjudication by an impartial tribunal vested with law-
ful jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions involved, 
after reasonable notice to the parties interested and an op· 
portunity for them to be heard, fulfills all the requirements 
of due process of law.'' 
It is obvious· that the converse would be true, where a 
legitimate right was denied, without any form of hearing. 
We desire to call the Court's attention to the case of Ga·r-
jield v. United States, 53 L. Ed. 168. In the Garfield case, there 
was an action for a writ of mandamus to compel the Sec.re-
tary of the lnterior to strike certain marks from his rolls, 
which had theretofore stricken the name of Goldsby, an ap-
prove~ member of the Chickasaw Nation. Goldsby claimed 
to be a citizen of the Chickasaw Nation and entitled to a share 
in their lands and that the act of the Secretary of the Interior 
had been taken, without notice to him. 
· Justice Day said: 
''The right to be heard before property is taken or rights 
or privileges, withdrawn, which have been legally awarded is 
of the essence of the due process of law~ It is unnecessary to 
recite the decisions in which this principle has been repeatedly 
recognized, and it is enough to say that it is a binding obliga-
tion that has never been questioned in this Court.'' 
See also ·Coe v." Armour, 59 L. Ed. 1027; Burdick's The 
La'W of the American Constitution, "Meaning of Due Pro-
cess'', p. 513. 
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The case of .A.brarns v. Daugherty (Cal.), 212 Pac. 942, 
is, we submit, in point and controlling. In that case, there 
was a proceeding to review the action of the Oommissioner 
of Corporations of the State of California, in suspending a 
certificate, authorizing the petitioner to act as a broker, un-
der the provisions of the .Securities Act of the- State of Cali-
fornia. Under the Act, the Commissioner could justify a 
revocation of the ·license, if he should find that the petitioner 
was in bad repute or had viola ted some provision of the act, 
or had engaged, or was about to engage in fraudulent trans-
aetions. The act failed to provide for any hearing. The 
Court held the act void. 
The Virginia Act makes no provision with referenc-e to 
the granting of a permit, except to say that the 'application 
shall be in writing'. It does state that revocation or suspen-
sion shall be "upon violation of any of the terms of this 
act". Since the· defendant is admittedly purs~ting a lawful 
business is it not a .fai·r request to be perm·itte.d to be heard, 
on the question of whether or not he is, in fact, 'IJiolating the 
terms of the act? We submit, with confidence, that there ean 
be but one answer to this question. 
Another important and interesting case is People v. Wil-
son (19!7), 166 N. Y. S. 211. In that case, there was an ac-
tion by the People, at the relation of the dairy company 
against one Wilson to review a determination in revoking a 
license of the said Wilson to purchase milk. The act pro-
vided that there might he a revocation of the license, when 
the commissioner is satisfied of the existence of the follow-
ing cas-es, or either of them; where there has been a continued 
course of dealing of such nature, as to satisfy the commis-
sioner of the inability of the applicant or licensee to prop-
erly conduct the business, or of an intent to deceive or de-
fraud customers. The Court said, at p. 212: 
'"A license to purchase· milk urider the Agricultural Law 
is a property right, and the licensee cannot be deprived of 
it, except upon due cause shown. We cannot assume that 
the statute intended to vest the commissioner with absolute 
arbitrary power to destroy the value of the license at will 
and without an opportunity of a hearing. The policy of the. 
law is that the owner shall not be deprived of his property 
rights without notice of the complaint against him and an 
opportunity to be heard in defense. St~~Jart v. Pal1ner, 74 N. 
Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289. The right to notice is fundamen-
tal, and so natural that it does not require discussion." 
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Aside from the question of the total failure to give the de-
fendant notice or an opportunity to be heard, we say that the 
act is void, in so far as it relates to permits, in that it fails 
to declare a policy and leaves all of the disputed facts en-
tirely to the judg·ment of a lo,~ter adnunistrative head. 
The case is not unlike the so-called ' 'hot oil'' case, under 
the National Recovery Act, reported under the style of 
Panama fiefining 'Co. v. Ryan, 79 L. Ed. 446, and a portion 
of the Schechter case, Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 
55 Supreme Court Rep. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570. The power dele-
gated in this act to the administrative head to set himself 
up as an Arbiter Elegantiarum is ''unconfined and vagrant''. 
Cardozo, J., supra. 
It is submitted, 'vith unfeigned confidence, that the act is 
unconstitutional and void for this reason alone. 
We desire to call the Court's attention to the following 
cases which we regard as conclusive and controlling. 
In State ex rel. etc .. v. Louisia;na State Boxing Commis-
sion, 112 So. 31, the relator prosecuted an appeal from the 
action of the Louisiana State Boxing Commission, undertak-
ing to revoke his license to conduct a prize-fight. The court 
says: 
"* * * Where, however, the statute is silent as to notice 
and hearing, the legislative intent in regard thereto must 
be determined from the lang·uage of the statute itself. 
'' ... t\.ct 123 of 1920 neither provides. for notice and hearing 
upon revocation, nor that such notice and hearing is un-
necessary. It is silent upon that point. In its language, how-
ever, a distinction is drawn between the manner of issuing 
and the method of revoking· a license. The commission may 
issue the license at its discretion, but it can only revoke it for 
cause. The distinction appears to have been made ex indus:.. 
tria by the legislature. Since it is contrary to all legal prin-
ciples and against the spirit of common fairness to condemn 
any individual upon any charge without giving him an op-
portunity to meet and disprove it, and, since the statute does 
not in express terms dispense with notice and hearing, 've 
think by fair implication, when it restricts the right of revo-
cation, by the commission for cause only, it necessarily means 
for any caus·e which the commission may determine justifies 
such action after notice and hearing to the licensee to ap-
pear and answer any charge or complaint lodged agBjnst 
him. 
''Nor can the right of the licensee to appear and be heard 
in defense of his rights be considered a mere empty one. 
Conceding that the action of the commission in revoking for 
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cause any license granted by it is final and not subject to 
judicial review, nevertheless, even in such a case, since the 
only protection afforded to an innocent holder of a license 
lies in the fairness, honesty and efficiency of the members 
of the commission as public officials, and in the presumption 
that they will not act arbitrarily or capriciously in the per-
formance of their official duties, it may well happen that, 
when an opportunity is given to a licensee to be heard oii 
complaints or charges against him, he may make such de-
fense or offer such explanation as will convince a conscien-
tious and fairminded tribunal that said charges or complaints 
are unfounded, or possess so little merit as not to require 
the imposition upon him of the extreme penalty of revoca-
tion of his license. '' 
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower Court, dis-
missing relator's petition. 
In Angelopoulos v. Bottorff (Cal.), 245 Pa. 447, the plain-
tiff, a restaurant keeper, brought an action. to restrain the de-
fendant, the City Manager, from interfering with his busi-
ness, as a restaurant keeper, by virtue of a purported revo-
cation of a license, theretofore issued to him. 
The Court says : 
''It has been held that notice and opportunity to be heard 
is a right and not a mere matter of discretion. In Brookes v. 
City of Oakland, 117 P. 433, 160 Cal. 423, the same rule is 
applied with regard to se,ver assessments, holding notice and 
an opportunity to be heard necessary. Also in Banne1~mq,n 
v. Boyle, 116 P. 732, 160 Cal. 197, it is held that, where it is 
provided that an officer may be removed for cause without 
other qualifying words, such removal can only be had after 
notice and hearing·. The san1e rule is also laid down in 16 
Cal. Jr. 261. In the case of 8tate ex rel. Makri.~ v. Superior 
Court of Pierce County, 193 P. 845, 113 Wash. 296, 12 A. L. 
R. 1428, the questions which we are here considering were 
fully considered and the rule which we have stated followed. 
In the ~!fakris Case, supra, the ordinance involved con-
tained the following: 
'' 'The license "of any business mentioned in this section may 
be revoked by the commissioner of public safety in his discre-
tion for disorderly or immoral conduct or gambling on the 
premises, or whenever the preservation of public morality, 
health, peace or good order shall in his judgment render such 
reyocation necessary', etc. 
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''No prov.ision was made for hearing. The commissioner of 
public health, being· of the opinion that a certain candy store 
having permission to sell soft drinks, without any previ-
ous notice or hearing, notified Makris among other things, 
as follows : 
, " 'You are hereby advised that said license is revoked, ef-
fectively to-day, under the provisions of section 47 of Ordi-
nance No. 67 49 as amended by Ordinance No. 7301.' 
''The Court, in holding the order of revocation void and the 
section of the . ordinance providing therefor, void, used the 
following language : · 
" 'Our decision in 8eattle v. Gibson (165 P. 1.09, 96 Wash. 
425), and those of the federal and state courts upon which 
that decision is rested render it plain that it is sufficient to 
render a law or ordinance void in the light of these consti-
tutional guaranties, if the prescribed manner of administering · 
such law or ordinance results in leaving the question of the 
propriety of issuing, withholding, or revoking a license to 
conduct an ordinarily lawful business, and thus the question 
of who may and who may not engage in such business, to the 
decision of any officer or set of officers, uncontrolled by any 
prescribed rule of ·action.' '' 
See also Abra1rM v. Jones, 207 Pac. 724. It is submitted, 
with confidence, that the act is plainly unconstitutional, for 
the reasons stated. 
DEFENDANT'S PLIGHT IN THE ABSENCE OF 
HEARING. 
It is submitted that where a statute fails to provide for 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, when a license to con-
duct l~gitimate business is concerned, an applicant is at 
the mercy of the uncontrolled discretion of the director. It 
might be perfectly true that the board, or the inspector, as 
the case may be, mig·ht act honestly in declining a permit. 
On the other hand, it is -equally as plausible and possible 
that a board or individual inspector might act capriciously or 
arbitrarily. Assume, for the purpose of argument, that the 
Director, arbitrarily declined to grant a license. It was sug-
g·ested by the trial court that the proper procedure would be 
mandamus. Such, we submit, with deference, is not the law. 
If the defendant had sought, at great expense, to go to Rich-
mond, where the Director resides and there petitioned the 
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Court for 1nandamus to compel issuance of a license, he would 
immediately have been confronted with the defense that man-
damus will not lie to compel the performance of an act, in 
which there is a discretion in the party against whom man-
damus i~ sought. Case after case has declar€d this princi-
ple. See, for example, Doby v. Pence (Idaho), 107 Pac. 484; 
27 L. R. A. (U. S.) 1194. See, also Cyc., p. 137; 'l.'aylor v. 
Smith, 140 Va. 217. 
Another all sufficient answer to this suggestion would be 
the anomalous position a litigant would be placed in, seek-
ing a mandamus to con1pel an administrative board or offi-
~er to grant him a license under a statute, 'vhich he claims is 
unconstitutional. Aside from this fact, our Court Jlas spe-
cifically stated, in Thompson v. 81nith, 155 Va. 367, that the 
procedure adopted by the defendant in this case is the correct 
procedure, that is to say, to wait until a ~harge had been 
pr€ferred and then interpose the defense that the statute was 
void. 
THE ACT IN QUESTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AND VOID IN THAT IT LODGES IN AN ADMINIS-
TRATIVE BODY AN UN·CONTROLLED DISCRE-
TION TO GRANT OR REFUSE LICENSES. 
Upon a close examination of the portion of the act, relat-
ing to permits, it will be observed that it merely provides that 
it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture and dis-
tribute ioo cream or frozen products, as defined in the act, 
u who does not possess an u.nrevoked permit from the Comm·is-
.~ioner of A,qricu!.ture and l'ln'lnigration issued by the Directot' 
of the Division of Dairy Olltd Food. e • * Application for 
permit shall be made in writing to the Directo1· of Dairy and 
Food of the Department of Agriculture and .Immigration.'' 
Attention is directed to the fact that this is all there is 
in the act, which relates to th€ original grant or refu.~al of a 
license, to manufacture or distribute ice cream or frozen 
products. The act does provide that permits ''may be .c;~s­
pended or revoked upon the violation of any of the terms of _ 
this act • • *." This applies only to revocation or suspension 
of a permit. It therefore, at once becomes apparent that 
there is not one syllable in the act, which says by what 11t'inci-
ples the Director o.f the Di1-'isio-n of Dairy and Food, or his 
subordinates shall be guided in the or-iginal granting or re-
fusal of a permit. . 
We do not think the Court can r€ad into the statute, rights 
or principles, with regard to the grant or refusal of a permit, 
whi~h admittedly, under the act apply only to the revocat~on 
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or suspension of the permit, which may be done for violations 
of the act. It will he 1·emombered that this section of the stat-
'Ute is penal and' being perttal, it mu;st be strictly constnted. 
This, of course, is an elementary principle of law, which re-
quires no citation or authority. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the statute in so 
far as it relates to the original granting or refusal of a per-
Init, such as was in defendant's case, that the same is plainly 
unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it lodges a dis-
cretion, which may be exercised arbitrarily by the Dire·ctor 
or Commissioner. 
The Virginia case of Thontpson v. S·mith, 155 Va. 367, is 
one of the leading cases, in the Country and is, we· submit, 
controlling. 
''Where a statute or ordinance assumes to regulate the 
exercise of a common right, such as that here involved, by 
requiring a permit for the exercise thereof, which is to be 
granted or refused and may be revoked by an administrative 
officer in his discretion, the correct principles for determining 
whether it is void because it delegates legislative power to the 
administrative officer are stated by the court in M'ltt'll·a.l Fil·m 
OortJ. v. Ohio Indtttstrial Com·mission, 236 U. S. 239, 35 Sup. 
Ct. 387, 392, 59 L. Ed. 552, Ann. Cas. 1916-C,. 296, in the fol-
lowing lang'Uage: 'The legislature n1ust declare the policy of 
the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in 
given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with 
the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the 
policy and principles apply.' 
'' 1\Iere matters of detail within the policy, and the legal 
principles and standards established by the statute or ordi-
nance, may properly be left to administrative di·scretion, for 
the determination of such matters of detail is more essen-
tially ministerial than legislative. In declaring the policy 
of the law and fixing the legal principles and standards which 
are to control in the administration of the law, general terms, 
·which get precision from the technical knowledge or sense 
and experience of men and thereby become reasonably ce~­
tain, may be used; and an administrative officer or bureau 
may be invested with the po,ver to ascertain and determine 
whether the. qualifications, faets or conditions comprehended 
in and required by such general terms exist, and whether the 
provisions of the la"r so fixed and declared have been complied 
with in accordance with the generally accepted meaning· of 
the words. llf'ltt'l~al Film Oo'rp. v. Ohio Tnd~tstria,l Co·?nmis-
sion, s'ltpra; Yee Bow v. Clevelancl, 99 Ohio St. 269, 124 N. 
F. A. Robertson v. Commonwealth. 15 
E. 132, 12 A. L. R. 1424; Block v. Chicago, 239 lll. 251, 87 
N. E. 1.011, 130 Am. St. R-ep. 219. '' 
·we ask in an .sincerity, if there is a syllable in this act, 
which indicates the guiding star, by which the director of 
the Division of Dairy and Food or his subordinate, shall be 
guided in granting o~ refusing· a. license 1 Could they not, 
under the act in question, merely say, ''We do not like the 
brand of ice cream sold by Mr. Robertson and we, therefore, 
decline to give him a permit''? 
As we have already pointed out, his position would be 
helpless, in that if he sought to compel an issuance of lic~nse 
by mandamus, he would be met with the defense that there is 
a discretion vested by the statute in the party, who is to grant 
the license, and mandamus will not lie, to compel the perform-
ance of any discretinary aet. 
The celebrated case involving the validity of the National 
Recovery Act, Schechter v:. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 
55 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837, 79 L. Ed. 15·70, is important and in-
teresting in this connection. We invite the Court's especial 
attention to it. 
See also, Pananta Rejini1~g C.ompany v. Ryan, 79 L. Ed. 
446. 
Vv e do not deem it necessary to review all of the cases on 
this point, for the opinion by Epes, J., in Thompson v. Smith, 
s~tpra, has been universally recognized as one of the leading 
cases in this Country, on what constitutes a delegated legisla-
tive power to administrative officers and boards. Without 
quoting, further, from the case, we respectfully submit, with 
unaffected confidence that the act in question is unconstitu-
tional ·and void on this ground. 
TB:E ACT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
It was the -contention of the defendant, in the trial court 
and he very earnestly contends here, that the act in ques-
tion is wholly inapplicable to a counter freezer unit, operated 
under the conditions disclosed in the evidence. The Legis-
lature's intention was to cover a comn1ercial ice cream manu-
facturing plant. We propose to examine the evidence in the 
record· on this point. 
At the outset, it is only necessary to discuss the testi-
mony of two witnesses for the Commonwealth, that of In-
spector Carlyle, who is connected with the Deparbp.ent .of 
Agriculture and Inunigration, Division of Food and Milk, 
and that of Mosby G. Perro,v, Health Officer. Without going 
into the evidence, in detail, for the record is short and the 
Court's attention is directed to it, in its entirety, we assert 
16 Suprem~ Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
that they undertook to point out several particulars, in which 
the 'defendant's drug store and his maintenance of the .counter 
freezer unit failed to comply with the act in question. In-
spector Carlyle testified that the defendant's drug store had 
a wood floor (R., p. 3), apparently in violation of Section 
(d). of the Act, relating to buildings .. Thereafter, he states 
that the law says it (referring to the room, in which ice creant 
is manufactured) must be well lighted, ventilated and effec-
tively screened. "I don't doubt but what Mr. Robertson 
would contend that his building generally complies with that 
but the conditions in that room make it such that it doesn't 
rneet the intent of the la'v in that that room is a general sales 
room for all the products which he handles in that drug 
store.'' (R., p. 4.) 
Complaint is then lodged ag·ainst the defendant on the 
ground that the rnix is exposed to the air, in pouring it from 
the jacketed container into the ·sn1aller containers and thence 
into the counter freezer. Further complaint is lodged against 
the place on the ground that sn1oking is permitted in the room 
where ice cream is manufactured (R., p. 8). Both Inspector 
Carlyle's testimony and that of Health Officer, Mosby G. Per-
row, seem to be predicated on the theory that, 'while tlze 
lauJ doe.s not 1·equire ice crea1n to be frozen in a separate 
'rr>om, that that really is the intent of the statute. For exam-
ple, see testimony of Carlyle (R., p. 11.) See also Perrow, 
who testifies (R., p. 22), that the State law requires that the 
room should be a separate room, and so on. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the act in ques-
tion applies wholly and solely to a commercial ice cream 
plant, where the mix is made and pasteurized and a continu-
ous operation takes place, there. We earnestly invite the 
Court's attention to the testimony of defendant's expert 
witness, .Aubrey H. Strauss (R., p. 33, et seq.) Strauss, 
a resident of Richmond, Virginia, a graduate of the Uni-
versity of Richmond, Massachusetts Universtiy of Tech-
nology, the University of Michigan and; for fifteen years, a 
specialist in bacteriology and public health, was City Bacte-
riologist, for Richmond, for about fifteen years. Thereafter, 
he was Associate Professor of Bacteriology of the Medical 
College of Virginia and Director of Laboratories for Virginia 
State Health Department, for a number of years. Quotations 
will not be made from· his testimony, but it is earnestly relied 
on and referred to (R., p. 34, et seq.) In substance, he 
states that the essential factor in handling· any milk prod-
uct is how the milk or cream itself is handled and the con-
ditions, under which it is pasteurized. ''Regarding the part 
of the procedure that is carried out at Mr. Robertson's Phar-
, 
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macy, whether that would be termed manufacturing or not 
I am in some doubt, but regarding the freezing at Mr. Rob· 
ertson's establishment, I would say that the chances of ex-
posure were reduced to a: minimum.'' (R., p. 35.) 
The possibility of contamination, either by air, or by smok-
ing, the principal complaint made by the Commonwealth's 
'witnesses, bore no possible reasonable relation to the counter 
freezer, for the rea-son that it is absolutely air-tight and the 
only contamination that could occur, would be when the mix 
is put into the freezer, at which time the possibility of air 
contamination is neg·ligible. He cites and quotes authorities 
to sustain him on this point, by a celebrated bacteriologist, 
at the Michig·a.n State College of AgTiculture Experimental 
Station, entitled, A Study of the Si,gnificance of Air in Rela-
tion to Icc Cream. 
This authority states, after a prolonged series of examina-
tions, that bacterial contamination from the air is insignifi-
cant. 
The witness then testified that he examined specimens of 
the ice cream, made in the counter freezer (R., pp. 37 ... 38). 
The sum and substance of his testimony is that in so far as 
bacterial content is concerned, the ice cream compared most 
favorably with that made in any standard commercial ice 
cream plant. His testimony, on p. 39, is interesting: · 
'' Q. Could you tell me 'vhether or not the floor and the 
sn1oke alluded to here could have any reasonable relation to 
the manufacture of ice cream under the circumstances we are 
discussing here Y 
"A. My interpretation of the statute would be that it 
\vas intended to cover a plant where the complete manufacture 
of ice cream takes place. The essential part of pasteuriza-
tion and the handling of ice cream in bulk as you g·et it in 
any large ice cream manufacturing plant or dairy is what 
I think this statute is intended to cover and in that case· I 
thinlr these standards are reasonable because you have your 
pasteurization vats which are a very vital part of it and you 
have got the whole process going on under one cover. That 
would correspond more to the plant in which this mix is 
prepared than the place where the freezing is merely. done. 
It is extremely doubtful in my mind whether the purP.ort 
of the statute was to cover the incidental proeess of freezing 
this ice cream. It would seem to me that the whole standard 
of the law was made to apply to the plant where the whole 
thing was carried out, particularly the pasteurization. I 
didn't answer your question specifically. I don't think that 
the floor could have any possible bearing on the freezing of 
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this ice cream, nor do I see any possible bearing that the 
presence of tobacco sn1oke would have. In the first place the 
smoking is not likely to occur in the immediate vicinity of the 
freezer. The freezer is over to one side, not around the 
counter where the customer·s are likely to be standing, but 
even if :t \Vere there I don't see any bearing.'' 
The defendant earnestly contends, that upon a reading of 
the act, the conclusion reached by the witness, Strauss, is ac-
curate. It. might be wise to first consider a brief history of 
the act. 
The original act, relating to ice cream, came into the Code 
by the Acts of Assembly of 1912, p. 113. The act, Chapter 
71, 'v,as entitled, ''An act to prevent deception in the sale of 
ice cream and establish standards for the same, defining· con-
densed milk and providing for its sale''. 
In the Acts of Assembly, 1916, ·Chapter 454, p. 770, un-
der the Title, ''An Act to amend section 5 of an act entitled, 
An act to prevent deception in the sale of ice cream and es-
tablish standards for the same, defining condensed milk and 
providing for its sale''. 
In the Acts of Assembly of 1920, p. 457, chapter 363, it was 
then carried as an act to amend and re-enact sections 1215, 
1216 and 1217 of the Code of Virginia. 
The present law, the Acts of Assembly 1934, Chapter 391, 
under an ~ct entitled, ''An act to amend and re-enact section 
1215 of the Code of Virginia, heretofore amended, relating to 
ice cream and other frozen products and to repeal sections 
1216 and 1:217 of the Code of Virginia and any and all of the 
other acts am~ndatory thereof, relating· to the same sub-
jects". · 
It will be observed that the counter freezer had never con1e 
into existence, during the early life of the act, in question. 
It will further be observed that no permit was ever required, 
prior to 1932. It is the undisputed testimony that in so 
far as the defendant is concerned he purchases a mix, which 
is admittedly sanitary and correct. The entire process in 
which he deals, is pouring the mix from the sealed cans, into 
the air-tight freezer, and freezing the same. It will be re-
called that even the testimony of Doctor Perrow and the 
Inspector was to the effect that the ice cream could not be 
::tffected, while it was in the counter freezer and could only 
be affected, during the period of time, in which it would be 
exposed, in pouring- the same, from the sealed cans into the 
freezer, a time estimated as from two to five n1inutes. 
Now, let us examine the act in question, as to whether or 
not it was designed to apply to a counter freezer. The act, 
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being an act, relating to ice cream and other frozen pr9d-
ucts, has certain definitions at its inception. It is neces-
sary that certain ingTedients be compounded, as is indicated 
in the definitions, to make them constitute ice cream, within 
the meaning of the act. The act, section (a) has a clause, re-
lating to pa..c:;teurization. Further, it will be discovered that 
the act has reference to pasteurization equipment and pas-
teurizers of an approved type. It, of course, at once, be-
comes apparent that no such things were necessary nor con-
tentplated, in the mere fre.ezi·ng of the ice cream, under this 
act. 
It has been pointed out that the Division of Dairy and 
Foods, itself, thinks that the act to be effective, should re- · 
quire the manufacture in a separate room. It will further be 
observed, that the terms of the act, relating to pe-rmits, ap-
plies "to any person, firm, or association, manufacturing icc 
cream, in the State of Virginia, for sale, or sell or offer for 
sale therein or to distribute any ice cream or frozen products''. 
Obviously, the terms would cover a retailer of ice cream. 
The inspector gives us the view of his department, as to the 
interpretation of . the act, in its applicability to retail ice 
cream dealers. No permits are required for them, at all 
(R., p. 16), although, by the terms of the act, they are clearly 
required to have a permit. It is obvious that they have, by 
this so-called interpretation with reference to a separate 
room, tmdertaken to place under the terms of the act, a mere 
form of freezing ice cream, which was never intended by the 
Legislature. The word "manufacture'.' really denotes a 
change in the form or substance of the material used and does 
not include the process of putting together the component 
parts of an article. 
It is earnestly submitted that when the act is read, in-
cluding its definitions, with reference to the situation disclosed 
by the evidence in this record, the conclusion is inescapable 
that the defendant's small business would not con1e within 
the terms of the act, a.nd therefore no permit should legally 
haY~ been required of him. No permit being leg·ally required 
of him, the judgment of the court would have been without 
evidence to support it. vVe earnestly urge that this ·Court 
should so conclude. 
CONCLUSION. 
Your petitioner, heretofore referred to as defenda:qt, there-
fore prays that a writ of error and s'ltpersedeas may be 
awarded to the judgment of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg, entered, as aforesaid, and that the same 
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may be reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed, or 
that your petitioner may be accorded a new trial. 
In the event a writ of error is awarded, this petition will 
be adopted as defendant's first brief on appeal. 
A copy of this petition, was, in pursuance of the rules of 
t~s Court, delivered to W. T. Spencer, Jr., attorney, in the 
tna~·Court, for the Commonwealth on the 1st day of Decem-
ber., 1936. · 
ResP'!ctfully sub~tted, 
F. A. ROBERTSON, 
·pAUL H. COLEMAN, p. q. 
By Counsel. 
I, Paul H. Coleman, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals, do certify that in my opinion it is proper 
that tlie case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. F. A. Robert-
son, be reviewed by the said Sup·reme Court of Appeals. 
P.A.UL H. COLEMAN. 
Writ of error and supersedeas granted this 18 day of Dec., 
1936. 
. H. B. G. 
Received December 21, 1936. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Aubrey E. Strode, judge of 
· the corporation court of the city of Lynchburg, at the 
court house thereof, on the 2nd day of Nov., 1936, and· in 
the 161st year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit, on the 3rd day 
of October, 1936, the case of Commonwealth v. F. A. Robert-
son, defendant, was docketed in the corporation court of 
th(? city of Lynchburg, upon appeal by the defendant from 
judgment of the judge of municipal court of said city. 
JUDGMENT OF JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, City of Lynchburg, To-wit: 
Be it remembered that on this 26 day of September, 1936, F. 
F. A. Robertson v. Commonwealtlt. 21 
A. Robertson, Mgr. Westover Pharmacy, was brought before· 
me, judge of the. city of Lynchburg, charged with a misde,;. 
meanor in this, that he did in said city on the . . . . day of 
September, 1936, unlawfully manufacture ice cream without a 
permit in violation of Sec. 1215 Acts of 1934, was by me, 
upon evidence on oath of Inspector E. L. Carlyle, found 
guilty of said offense, wherefore I adjudge that he pay a fine 
of $5.00 and $1.25 costs. 
JOS. P. McCARR9N, Judge. 
But the said F. A. Robertson, MgT. having prayed an ap-
peal from my said judgment, an appeal is hereby granted to 
the next term of the corporation court of Lyncliburg, and the 
said judgment and -conviction, as well as the said appeal, is 
hereby certified to said court. 
Given under my hand this 26 day of September, 1936. 
JOS. P. McCARRON, Judge. 
At another day, to-wit, At Lynchburg Corporation Court, 
October· 22nd, 1936. 
Commonwealth 
'l'. 
F. A. Robertson (white), Defendant. 
UPON. APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT UPON A 
CHARGE OF MANUFJ\.CTURING ICE CREAM 
'VITH01JT A PER~ITT. 
This day came the Commonwealth's attorney, and the said 
F. A. Robertson appeared by his attorney, as well as in his 
own proper person in discharge of his recognizance, and said 
parties waiving their right of trial by jury, submitted the 
whole matter of la'v and of fact to the court, and the evidence 
being heard, and the court not being advised of its judgment 
to be given in the premises, takes time. to e.onsider thereof. 
Stenographic report of the testimony and other incidents 
of trial of the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. F. A. 
Robertson, decided at Lynchburg·, Virginia, on October 22, 
1936, before the Honorable Aubrey E. Strode of the ·Corpo-
ration Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia. 
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page 2 ~ E. L. CARLYLE, 
having· been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA1\1INATION. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. 1\{r. Carlyle, I believe you are Inspector of the De-
partment of Agriculture and Immigration, Division of Food 
and :Milk, are you not f 
A. -y·es, sir. 
Q. As such did you visit this store of Mr. Robertson on 
l\{emorial Avenue near Eldon? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is a drug store, I believe. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For what purpose did you visit itT 
A. (Addressing the Court) Your Honor, may I explain in 
my own words "the situation I fou:J;ld there? 
By the Court: 
Q. You answer the question Mr. Spencer asked you: For 
what purpose did you visit it? 
A. I went there for an inspection. 
Q. Mr. Spencer asked you for what purpose you went 
there. 
A. I went there for an inspection. 
Q. Now, you answer the next question he asks you. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. An inspection to determine whether or not a permit 
should be granted for the manufacture of ice cream? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you describe to his Honor the conditions which 
you found there under which it was proposed to 
page 3 ~ manufacture ice crean1 and give the court the reason 
for refusing the permit? 
A. Your Honor, I found, when I called on Mr. Robertson, 
that he had this counter type freezer located in the immedi-. 
ate front of his drug store on a wooden floor and he imme-
diately told me that it had been installed there for the pur-
pose of making a test case over the ice cream law, but asked 
me 'vhat he could do to get a permit and leave his machine 
in that present location, and since that,,vas the situation I 
told him I couldn't tell him anything that he could do that 
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would allow him to be issued a permit with his machine set 
in the immediate front of .his drug store. 
Q. Now you say ''in the immediate front of his drug store''. 
What is the nature of the flooring in there in the front of 
his drug storeY 
A. Well, he ha:s a wood floor, and, as I recall, he just had it 
mopped down 'vith something, perhaps oil. It is a wood floor 
throughout the front of the drug store. 
Q. What does the act require as to a place where ice cream 
is manufactured as to the floor Y 
A. The law specified concrete or other impervious floor, 
constructed to dry and drain, and must be flushed down with 
water to keep down dust and so forth. 
Q. Was the room he proposes to manufacture ice cream 
so equipped in any respect Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What does the act require as to the room be-
page 4 ~ ing screened Y 
By Mr. Coleman: Isn't that a question for the Court to 
decide? 
By the Court: He can be asked about that. 
By :1\{r. Spencer: 
Q. Tell the Court in what ways this room differed from 
what the law requires. · 
A. The law says it must be 'veil lighted, ventilated and ef-
fectively screened. I don't doubt but what Mr. Robertson 
would contend that his building generally complies with that 
but the conditions in that room makes it such that it doesn't 
meet the intent of the law in that that room is a general sales 
room for all the products whi-ch he handles in that drug 
store. All of his shelves and everything that he handles in 
there creates a condition in that room where it is impossible 
to protect the product from dust and dirt and so forth, as I 
see it. 
Q. Is that room open to the general public? 
A. Yes, sir. Ho,vev.er, at the time we were there the front 
of his building· was not screened. The law requires that the 
building shall be screened in fly season and we are now com-
ing to the time 'vhen it won't be required, but up to now it is 
required, and his building at the time I was there was not 
screened in front. In fact they had the front out working 
on it. 
Q. Did yon find flies around this equipment Y 
. A. There were considerable flies and they were 
page 5 r flying around on his machine at the time. 
24 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia. 
By the Court: 
Q. You speak pf his machine. You mean his ice cream 
free~g machine Y 
·A~· Yes, sir. 
Mr,. Spencer (continues) : 
Q. How was he equipped to w·ash the cans in which the 
ice cream was handled Y 
.A. Well, at that time he hadn't installed,-hadn 't com-
pletely installed his sterilizing equipment. He has a gas 
heater which provides sufficient quantity of boiling water for 
st~rilizing· and he went further and had a metal vat, which the 
law requires, made and installed in his basement which meets 
the requirements of the law. 
Q. A metal what Y 
A." A metal wash vat of sufficient size to wash and ster-ilize 
his ~ans. However, that condition of that room is not suit-
able. In other words, after he has washed and sterilized his 
cans he wouldn't have any place to store them that would be 
suitable, by any means, to keep a sterilized can, and I don't 
know what he would do after he sterilized his eans to keep 
them clean. 
Q. How far is that vat located from his furnace Y 
A. I would say five or six feet. It was almost directly in 
front of his furnace and his basement is a general storeroom 
for boxes and supplies and t~ings that will accumulate in a 
business and naturally go to the basement. 
page 6 } Q. Any place to set the .cans after they were steri-
lized? 
A. No clean, suitable place suitable for keeping a steri-
lized can of that sort sterilized and clean for any time. 
Q. That room in the basement is used for general storage Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the cans would have to be washed down there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he have any place to make or mix his ice cream,-
to handle the mix before it was put into the machine? Did 
he tell you where he mixed it? 
A. He told me that he poured his mix,-he buys his mix in 
ten gallon cans shipped in there in jacketed cans and he has 
to pour that mix from those ten g·allon cans into smaller con-
tainers which he places in the stor~ge compartment of his 
counter type machine. Now, he told me he did that pouring 
in his prescription room. I didn't see that but that is a very . 
unsuitable place to handle a dairy product of any kind,, pour-
ing it from one can to another, in the prescription room of a 
drug store, as I see· it. 
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Q. Did he have any other place than the prescription room 
or the main roon1 out front to mix it 7 
A. No other place whatever except in the general front 
part of his drug store, or the prescription room. 
Q. How many such plants as this, manufacturing ice cream, 
in drug stores, or similar· places, are there in Lynch-
page 7 } burg Y 
A. There are seven. 
Q. Counting this one V 
A. Eight counting this one. 
Q. Tell his Honor where they are located, those seven? 
A. We have one at Long's Pharmac·y out on Hi vermont, 
one at ''Kid'' Fazzi 's in the bank building, or near the Peo-
ples National Bank Building, one at Wheeler's Pharmacy,-
and I might add that 1\fr. Robertson was formerly connected 
with Wheeler's Pharmacy and installed that counter freezer 
to meet the requirements of the law. We have one at Craig-
hill &·Jones Pharmacy, DeLancey's on Rivermont Avenue, 
and one at the \Vestover Creamery up near Mr. Robertson's 
place. 
Q. Seven of them not counting this one. Of those seven, 
are there any that have not met 'vith the requirements of this 
actf 
A.. No, sir. 
Q. Have they been issued a permitt. 
A. They have been issued permits. 
Q. After having met 'vith those requirements Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do those seven places manufacture their ice cream up 
in the front part of the building where the customers are 
or in. a separate roomY 
A. They manufacture in a separate part of the building, 
separate from the public part of their business, yes, sir. 
Q. Is there anything else I have overlooked in 
page 8} respect to this? You are more familiar with it 
than I am. 
A. I don't think so, except the fact that smoking is pro-
hibited in a place where ice cream is manufactured. Of 
course that would be impossible in a drug store because 
naturally if I go in a drug store I 'vould feel at Uberty to 
smoke there. . · 
Q. This room is the general storeroom and place of sell-
ing goods to the gene1·al publicY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And anybody smoking in there would be smoking· in 
the same room where this ice cream is manufactured f · 
A. Yes, sir. I might add, with your approval, that we 
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have issue_d 162 permits in the State of Virginia for the 
manufacture of ice cream and 31 of those permits have been 
issued for the counter type freezer which is in discussion here, 
which shows that "rhat we are trying to do is to carry out 
the intent of the law with the view to safeguarding the 
health of the public. That is our aim and we try to do that 
without showing any partiality. 
By the Court: 
Q. You speak of this as the counter type freezer and you 
say you have issued thirty-one permits for them, as I un-
derstand. Are those permits for the use of it in stores where 
there is smoking that you object to in this store? 
A. Those permits are issued wholly on the provisions of 
the law. To meet the provisions of the law is the only re-
quirement for the issuing· of a permit. 
Q. I didn't catch your reference to smoking. You 
page 9 ~ stated that you had issued permits for other coun-
ter type freezers. The name ''counter type'' hnports 
that they are issued to be set on the counter in stores, which 
further imports that they will be in the presence of smokers, 
and you say an objection here was that this one would be 
in the presence of smokers. In what respect wo~ld the con-
ditions be different here in respect to smoking in the pres-
ence of counter freezers than from the conditions w·here you 
have issued permits? 
A. The only way I could explain that is the fact that this 
counter type freezer is a new piece of equipment on the 
market and is designed to be set up in the place where the 
public generally can see the operation. That is one of the 
arguments they use in selling the machine, and we have no 
criticism whatever to make of the machine, it is perfectly-
Q. I didn't ask you that. You confine your answers to my 
questions, please, sir, and we will get on better. I am asking 
you about smoking. You said one objection would be that 
there would be smoking in the presence of thi_s machine, and 
then said you had issued thirty-one permits for other stores 
to use this same type of machine on their counter. 
A. No, str, no, sir. Permits have been issued for counter 
type freezers but they were installed in other rooms o1· a 
separate part of the building, not in the front. 
Q. That is what I wanted to get. 
A. The ones that have had permits issued to them have 
met all the requirements of the law. 
page 10 ~ Q. And they were not installed in the common 
storeroom where there was smoking?. 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. They were not installed in the common storeroom where 
there would. be smoking and this one would be and was? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. I wish you would tell his Honor about the process of 
making ice cream out of this commercial mix· which you have 
referred to. First tell him what commercial mix is, and then 
the process of making ice cream with the commercial mix. 
By the Court : Why does that come in here 7 · 
By Mr. Spencer: I want to show how many times it is ex-
posed to the air in the operations. · 
By the Witness : 
A. The mix we refer to as commercial mix is made in a 
plant where it meets all ·the requirements of the law and 
is shipped from that plant to the buyers and is ready to 
freez~ with the exception of adding the flavors. Now, when 
they bring it into their place where they manufacture the 
cream it means that they have to pour it from those ten 
gallon cans in to smaller containers to place in their storage 
room of their freezing compartment. Then in turn it is 
taken out of that storage compartment and poured directly 
into the top part of their freezer, which is ex-
page 11 }- posed again to the conditions of that room, and 
then after it is frozen it is dra'vn off usually 
in pint and quart containers and in the case of drawing 
off say two and a .half gallons, or five gallons of ice cream, 
depending on the size of the freezer, it takes consider.able 
time to draw it off in pint and quart containers and then the 
ice cream is exposed again to the conditions of the room in 
which it is being handled. · 
Q. ·So in the process of using such a freezer as is proposed 
to b~ used here the ice cream or mix is exposed to the air 
of that room three times. 
A. Yes, sir. • 
Q. And the last operation for a considerable period of 
time? 
. A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Mr. Carlyle, there is nothing in the act requiring coun-
ter freezers to be located in a separate room, is there? 
A. I tried to explain that. The act does not say a sepa-
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rate room but from what it does say the only way to get 
around those contaminating conditions is to use a separate 
room. 
Q. If you just answer my questions. 
A. That is right. It doesn't state a separate room is re-
quired. · 
Q. Now, coming to the specific location with which we 
are dealing, is there any place at the Westover Pharmacy 
where this counter freezer could be located which would be 
in any way as nearly sanitary as it is located a.t 
page 12 ~ present f 
A. Not without constructing or changing the · 
building to prepare a room for that purpose. . 
Q. Not without making a new building or adding on to 
itY 
A. That is right. 
Q. Are you familiar with the operation of counter freezers f 
A. I think so, yes, sir. 
Q. It is a fact that once the mix gets into the counter 
freezer, a picture of which I have here, it is air-tight, is it 
notY 
A. Yes, sir, I don't dispute that. 
Q. That is a fact, that it is air-tight Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court : Which do yon mean, the mixture or the 
counter freezer? 
By Mr. Coleman: The counter freezer. 
Q: In other words, once the mix gets in the freezer it is 
impossible for any air to contaminate it after it gets in. 
A. It is all right while it is in the freezer. 
Q. Then, I gatheir, even if people would smoke in the 
presence of the counter freezer it could not possibly have 
any effect on the ice cream, could it Y 
A. Not while it is being froze, no, sir. 
Q. That is what the act is designed to cover, 
page 13 ~ the freezing of ice cream, is it not Y 
A. Well, the freezing and handling of the in-
gredients going into the ice cream. 
Q. Now, you have testified that so far as the freezing 
of ice cream is concerned here Mr. Robertson buys his mix 
from a recognized concern known as ''The Pet Milk Com-
pany''; does he not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. That mix is shipped here in sealed cans with a seal on 
it, is it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Free from any dust or·any possibility of contamination 1 
A. Perfectly all right and within the ·law. 
Q. So that the only complaint that you lodge here is the 
time that the mix is exposed to the air from the time it is 
poured into the counter freezer, is that it! 
A. Yes, sir, and the conditions :under which he handles it. 
Q. Your construction of the-act in its applicability through-
out the State, is that it ought to be done in a separate room, 
is that itY 
A. In a room that can be kept clean a.nd equipped with a 
concrete floor. 
Q. You stated that Mr. Robertson had a wooden floor. 
It is a fact he has a linoleum floor, has he not~ 
A. He did not at the time I was there. 
page 14 } Q. Are you positive of that 1 
A. I am positive of tl1at. 
Q. He did not.have some character of floor covering' 
A. No, sir, he did not. 
Q. Do you ha.ve any knowledge as to the relative bacterial 
count of ice cream manufactured in a counter freezer as com-
pared with commercial ice creamY 
A. None whatever. We have no requirement in the law, 
no provision for bacteria. 
Q. You have ·no low standard of bacterial count with refer-
ence to ice cream T 
A. None whatever. 
Q. Now, in the final analysis, your complaint is that from 
the time it takes to pour the ice cream into the top of this 
freezer is the time that it is exposed to air, is that itf 
A. That is one time. 
Q. When is the other time 7 
A. When he pours it from his mix cans into the· smaller 
containers to place in the storage comp-artment which he 
said he did in the prescription room-that _is, pouring fron1 · 
the ten gallon cans. I don't know the size of those smaller 
containers, whether two and a half gallons or two gallons. 
If they are hvo gallon containers that would mean he would 
l1ave five containers to pour ten gallons of mix into, which 
he said he did in the prescription room. . 
Q. That would take approximately how long 1 
}Jag-a 15 ~ A. I would say offhand five minutes to take 
those eans out and carry them back there, set them 
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on the floor, and after he had taken the lid off the can to pour 
it from one to the other I would say five minutes. 
Q. Five minutes there. Now how long would you estimate 
the mix would be exposed to the· air when being poured into 
the counter freezer Y 
A. Well, I would say in pouring ten gallons, which he 
"\Vouldn 't at any one time, but that volume \vould take five 
or ten minutes. If they are two and a half gallon freezers, 
to use up his ten g·allons of 1nix which he got in the can, 1 
would say eight or ten minutes. 
Q. Now, have you ever, in your work with the depart-
ment, considered the relation of exposure to air to the bac-
terial count in ice crean11 
A. We have considered it, yes, sir. 
Q. Have you had any authorities discussed with you or 
shown to you on that point! 
A. No, sir, we have never taken any definite a~tion, but it 
has been considered. 
Q. Are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Fred-
erick vV. Fabian of the Department of Bacteriology and Hy-
gf.ne of the :Michigan State College1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know him Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don't know him as an authority on sanitary rela-
tions in regard to ice creamY · 
page 16 ·~ A. No, sir. 
Q. Would you be in position then to dispute a 
statement made by him, as a result of his studies, that the 
exposure of ice cream even for long periods of time to the 
air has no significant relation to the bacterial count in it? 
. A. No, sir. 
·Q. You wouldn't. dispute tha.t? 
A. I wouldn't dispute that, no, sir. 
Q. And you don't know how the bacterial count of ice cream 
I manufactured as this is manufactured compares with the 
manufacture of commercial ice creamY. 
A. We give no concern to bacterial· count. 
Q. One other question I want to ask you. In the enforce-
ment of this act throughout the State has it been the policy 
of the State to require people who retail ice cream to have 
permits? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You mean to say you require of everybody, every seller 
of ice cream in the Commonwealth, a permit T 
A. Yes, sir, issued on the conditions of his plant, and 
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he is required to have a permit to buy, sell or manufacture 
ice cream in the State of Virginia. 
Q. I am asking you· this question: Does this departm,ent 
require of people who merely retail ice cream a permit to 
sell it in Virginia Y 
A. No, sir. 
·Q. It does not7 
A. No, sir, not unless it is without the State. 
page 17 ~ Q. I am talking about within the State. 
A. It does not. · · 
Q. So the act, in its enforcement, is confined ent.irely to 
people who are manufacturing ice cream for sale, is that it? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, the basement .of Mr .. Robertson's place-
By the Court (interposing): I thought you were. going to 
ask him only one question. I will allow you to ask another if 
you want to. 
By Mr. Coleman: I want to ask him about the basement. 
Q. One other question. I will try to be as brief as possible. 
I believe you said it couldn't be located anywhere els·e 'vith-
out remodeling the store. 
A. That is right, it would have to be remodeled. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION~ 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Mr. Coleman asked you if your complaint or refusal 
of recommendation for a permit in this case was based merely 
on the fact that the ice cream was exposed three times during 
the course of its manufacture. I will ask you whether· you 
based your recommendation to the Director on which this 
permit was refused on that fact or on the fact that there were 
several details in which this place did not comply with the 
provisions of the act. 
. A. I did not mean to state that was the only thing on 
which we refused a permit. There were other conditions 
which I stated a while ago. 
page 18 r By the Court: I understood the sum and sub-
stance to be he refused the perrrrlt because the 
place didn't comply with the requirements of the statute. 
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·RE-CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr. Coleman: . 
Q. I wa:r;1t to ask you one more question. In the retail 
sale of ice cream it is, of course, necessary to open up the 
place you take it from to serve it, is it not~ 
A. Yes, sir. -
Q. In other words, if I was going to sell you a pint of ice 
cream from a place here I would have to open it up to dish 
it out to you, wouldn't I Y 
Q. Yes. 
Q. That is an exposure to air, is it not 1 
A. -res, sir. 
Q. And to a greater extent than this man's ice <~ream 
is exposed? 
A. Not as much. 
By the Court: Do you presume, Mr. Coleman, that the 
Court can take no judicial knowledge of the conditions that 
surround the retail sale of ice cream' 
By Mr. Coleman: I don't presume anything where I have 
got a record or am trying to make a record up. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 19 ~ C. L. ·PETERS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Your name is C. L. Peters Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What business are -you engaged in Y 
A. I work for Craighill and Jones Drug Store. 
Q. In the City of Lynchburg¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you have any special duties with regard to the 
making of ice cream at -Craighill & Jones' place? 
A. Yes, sir, I make all the ice cream. 
Q. Do you all have a permit from the State Board Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Permission from the food and dairy products? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you make your ice cream in the same room where 
your customers are served Y 
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By the Court: What is the materiality of that Y 
By Mr. Spencer : I want to show that this firm has found ' 
it easy to comply with the provisions of this act. 
By the Court: Very ·well, sir. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. I ask you this, Mr. Peters: Did your firm hav-e any 
difficulty or any particular hardship in complying 
page 20 ~ with the terms of the act 7 ~ . 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you find it convenient and helpful to operate with-
in the terms of this act in this separate room, or to the 
contrary! 
A. We round it very convenient. 
Q. You find it convenient¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you wash down the room in which you make your 
ice cream every time you make ice cream? 
A. Yes, sir, after each making. 
Q. Could you do that if you had it up in the front part 
of your store on a wooden floor 7 
A. Not as I do it. I wash it with a hose and soap. 
By the Court : 
Q. I understand you have a separate room in which you 
make it and pour out your mix and all that sort of thing 
and then you bring it up and put it in this counter freezer. 
A. No, sir, I have the counter freezer in a room to itself. 
Q. You have the counter fr-eezer in a room to itselfY 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Then after it is made you bring your ice cream up to 
the front? 
A. It is made and frozen and then brought to the front. 
page 21} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Craighill & Jones is a rather large ·drug store, is it 
. not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. More than one roomY 
A. More than one room, yes, sir. 
Q. When you bring it up to the front what do you put it 
in¥ 
A. We put it in a dispensing cabinet. . 
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Q. Something like this picture here with tl;le exception of 
this part here? 
A. Yes, sir, with the exception of the part with the motor 
on it. 
Q. You then put it in those kind of containers .and from 
there you retail it to the public~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
~IOSBY G. PERRO,V, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Dr. Perrow, I believe you occupy an official position in 
the City of Lynchburg? 
A. Yes, sir, Health Officer. 
Q. Have you been to this place run by Mr.· Robertson at 
Memorial A venue and Eldon Street 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 22 ~ Q. Did you see where he was making· his ice 
cream? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you tell the Court the condition of that room and 
the circumstances under which the ice cream was made? 
A. Well, the State law requires that the room should be 
a separate room with concrete or other impervious material. 
By Mr. Coleman: I object to that. There is nothing in 
the act to say it should be a separate room. 
B.y the Court: It isn't necessary for you, Doctor, to state 
what the law is. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Describe what you found, Dr. Perrow. 
A. There was a wooden floor and no concrete or im-
pervious floor. The law says it shall be properly drained and 
washed with water. Well, if you wash this with water there 
is no plumbing there to drain it off and there is no screens 
in front. It is very difficult to screen a store. People hold 
the doors open and they are always coming in and out and 
if there are any flies outside they pretty soon get inside 
and we have enforced that regulation here in Lynchburg 
without exception for years. I never heard any kicks against 
it. 
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Q. Did you see where he washed his cans Y 
A. Yes, sir, downstairs. · 
Q. Did you go down there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you consider that a proper and healthy 
page 23 } place to sterilize cans Y 
A. He can fix that place down there all right. 
Q. You saw itY · · 
A. Yes, sir. He had hot water and it could be washed 
down there. 
Q. Where would he put his cans afterwards f 
A. He didn't have any good place to hang them. but they 
could be washed there. 
Q. Was that a general storage room and a furna\!e room f 
A. Yes, sir, everything scattered around. It was a great 
big basement or cellar room with all kinds of odds and ends 
packed around. 
Q. How long have you been Health Officer in Lynchburg? 
A. Since 1910. You ought not to ask me that. 
Q. We won't tell on you outside. Do you, as a Health 
Officer, with your experience, conside_r it as a reasonable 
health regulation that ice cream should be made under cir-
cumstances that are required by this aet? 
A. I do. 
Q. Would there be any fair way of telling whether or not 
that was true by making a bacteria test of the ice cream? 
A. It wouldn't be a very good index, no, sir, because bac-
teria count vary so. Temperature is probably the biggest 
factor and then general sanitation. No,v, while you are 
pouring this mix or mashing up the fruit with which you 
flavor the mix, which could be mashed up in front, why 
people come in coughing, sneezing, and so forth, who might 
have tuberculosis, or any other kind of throat or 
page 24 ~ nose disease, particle.s of sputum flying might fly 
in the milk that wouldn't appear in the bacteria 
count. 
Q. That would not appearY 
A. No, sir, tuberculosis germs would not show up in the 
count of bacteria. The counting of bacteria is not for quality 
but for the quantity. ~Iilk can be most dangerous with a 
thousand bacterial count. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\{r. Coleman: 
Q. Doctor, what relation, if any, does the floor have to 
ice cream being frozen Y 
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A. Well, the purpose of having a concrete floor in kitchens 
and various places and dairies and places were foods are 
handled is so that they can be cleaned easily without dust. 
Q. If it develops that the ice cream is being manufac-
tured in a machine of this character do you think the floor 
would ·have any relation on earth to itt 
A. Yes, sir, when you clean it particles of dust fly up. 
Nothing makes for cleanliness like. a clean floor. If you 
have a clean floor the tendency is to make other things clean 
too. 
Q. It likewise makes for cleanliness to have them where 
people can see them, does it not Y 
·A. In a way that would be one of the advantages but 
it doesn't equal the disadvantages. 
Q. Yon say that the bacteriological count of ice cream 
is not a recognized method of testing it Y 
page 25 ~ A. No, I didn't say that. I say it is one index 
. but it is to be considered just like it'is with milk, 
but you can take a tubercular herd of milk cows and get 
a bacteria count of a thousand and have a most dangerous 
milk. 
Q. You have described the situation in which somebody 
. might be coughing in the store. Couldn't that occur when 
any retailer was serving the ice creamY 
A. Yes, sir, but you cut it to a minimum as far as pos-
sible. You can't make it absolutely perfect but you can pro-
tect it as m:uch as you can. 
Q. And it couldn't have any effect on it if it develops 
that it was being manufactured in an air-tight thing, could 
it? 
A. Not unless it was exposed. 
Q. The only time it could be exposed would be the time 
that the mix was being poured into the air-tight manufac-
turing apparatus. 
A. The :flavoring is oftentimes prepared outside, peaches 
and berries, and in this case it had to be prepared outside 
because there was nowhere else to do it. 
Q. If that mix is from a separate concern you minin1ize 
that, do you not T . 
A. The inix comes there safe and ought to be kept safe 
as much as possible. 
The witness stands aside. 
By Mr. Spencer: The Commonwealth rests. 
F. A. Robertson v. Commonwealth. 
page 26 ~ EVIDEN·CE FOR THE DEFENSE. 
The defendant, 
F. A. ROBERTSON, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Your name is F. A. Robertson? 
A. Yes, sir. 
37 
Q. Mr. Robertson, when did you open up. the Westover 
Pharmacy! 
A. About the third of September, I think it was. I couldn't 
say the exact date because they were working on the front 
·and I don't remember the exact day that the store was 
opened up. 
Q. Prior to opening up the Westover Pharmacy I will 
ask you· whether or not you wrote the Director of Dairy and 
Foods, Department of Agriculture and Immigration the fol-
lowing letter: 
By the Court: What is the use of going into all that de-
tail f Did he apply for a per~t? : 
By Mr. Coleman: The act requires him to do it in writ-
ing and I am showing that he did write them a letter. 
By the Court: 
Q. Did you apply in writing for a permit to manufacture 
ice creamY 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 27 } By Mr. Coleman: . . 
Q. All right, you made application. It is a 
fact, I take it, that shortly thereafter Mr. Carlyle came around 
to see your place? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall the date on which you were told that you 
had been refused a permit! · 
A. I don't remember the exact day. It was several days 
afterwards that I had a letter to that effect. 
Q. Were you ever accorded any hearing on your appli-
cation for a permit or did you ever receive any notice that 
t];ley would give you any opportunity to present your side of 
the matter at allY 
A. No, sir. 
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By the Court: ·: 
Q. Were you at your store when the inspector called! 
~. 1res, sir. · 
Q. You knew the purpose for which he 'vas there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Now, I wish you would tell the Court, if you will, sir, 
just what your set-up is there with reference to the manu-
facture of ice cream. Did you purchase a counter freezer Y 
A. Yes, sir, I have a counter freezer, and when I had my 
counter freezer in Mr. ·Carlyle came in a co,uple of days 
after I got it in and I asked him if he would ·cooperate 
with me and show me what I would have to do to get a per-
mit and he said he could not give me one unless 
page 28 } I moved it, you see, so therefore I just had to do 
the best way I could and do what I thought would 
n1eet the sanitary conditions. 
By the Court: 
Q. Did you undertake to comply with the requirements 
of the actY 
A. Everything but moving the freezer out of the store. I 
didn't move that. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Tell us, if you please, sir, what kind of flooring have 
you got there Y • 
A. We have a wood floor and we have what they term 
an impervious floor which we put behind the counter to keep 
the water from soaking into the wood. 
Q. Is this m~chine in which you freeze your ice cream 
an air-tight machine after the stuff gets in th53reT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell us how you handle t,he mix and the uianner in 
which it is handled. 
A. Well, the mix is poured-
Q. (interposing) Where do you get the mix from Y 
A. From. the Pet Milk Company. It comes. in ten gallon 
sealed containers with a jacket over it which keeps it cool. 
By the Court: There is no dispute about that, the mix. 
The witnesses for the Commonwealth said' that. 
By Mr. Coleman: All right. I can't read the 
page 29 ~ witness' mind. 
Q. Go ahead and tell us what you do after the rpix gets 
there. · · 
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A. We pour it into these small containers which we put 
in the storage box and when we get ready to make ice cream 
we take them one at a time and make the freeze. 
Q. For what length of time is the mix exposed to the airY 
A. Well, it is five quarts in a can and you pour it in a 
funnel. It wouldn't take over a half-minute to pour it in.·, 
It is a big funnel. 
Q. And then you shut up the top of this thing? 
A. Yes, sir. I never timed myself. 
Q. Now, about your washing the cans. Do you have hot 
waterY 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that done in a sanitary wayY 
A. It is to the best of my Imowledge, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Mr. Robertson, you had previously been at Wheeler's 
Pharmacy, had you not Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. While there you had supervision of ·the installation of 
a plant which met the approval of the inspector Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So that you knew what the requirements were Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, you wrote and asked for a permit know-
page 30 ~ ing it was going to be turned down, didn't you Y 
A. No, sir, not knowing it was going to he turned 
down. 
Q. Didn't you know you weren't complying with the law? 
A. I was going to comply as closely as I could. 
Q. Weren't you induced by this company selling this ma. 
·chine to you to make a test case of this merely for the· pur-
pose of making a test case and didn't they offer to give you 
a very substantial discount on your machine in order to 
malie this case Y 
A. Absolutely no. It is not so. 
Q. At the place you make your ice cream is on a wooden 
floor? 
A. No, I make my. ice cream in a machine and the ma-
chine sets on a wooden floor. 
Q. It has no drain? 
A. The floor does not, no, sir. 
Q. It is right next to your soda fountain, isn't it Y 
A. Next to my sandwich counter. 
Q. And that is in turn next to the soda fountain? 
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A. Soda fountain, cigar case and then the ice cream. 
. Q. Every person who comes to deal with you comes in 
that roomY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Sometimes you literally have scores in thereY 
, . A. Not as many as I would like. . 
Q. On Saturday nights don't you have college students 
in there and the room and floor are fullY 
A. No, sir, and besides I don't make ice cream 
page 31 ~ on Saturday. 
Q. There is nothing to keep smoke from getting 
over in the place occupied by this machine~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No way to keep smoke away from it? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You pour your mix behind the prescription counter Y 
A. I usually do. 
Q. That is really a part of the same roomY 
A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your prescription counter is cut off by a partition 
which doesn't go all the way to the ceiling? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So in effect you are pouring the mix in the same roomY 
, A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which is your general storeroom Y 
A. Yes, sir, the back end of it. 
Q. You have to pour that out into containers once, put it 
in the machine, then pour it from those containers into the 
mixing part, or rather the freezing part1 
A. Yes, sir, that is correct. 
Q. And then it is drawn out f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Three times exposed in that roomY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then have to go dow!nstairs to wash the 
page 32 ~ cans Y 
A. We have a sink and everything down in the 
basement. 
Q. And they are washed in the basement Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Mr. Spencer asked you about the method of installation. 
The only difference between the method of installation at 
Wheeler's Pharmacy and any other place is that it is in a 
separate room, is that it! · 
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A. That is it, and that door always stays open. 
Q. You say the door to that room always stays open Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the only difference· in your counter freezer and 
any other that you have any knowledge of is the fact tl1at 
the others are. in separate rooms Y 
A. That is it-. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Mr. Robertson, right back of this counter freezer arc 
your medicine shelves Y 
A. Yes, sir, in glass cases. 
Q. You can't turn a hose on those and wash the walls he-
llind your counter Y 
A. No, sir, I can't wash the walls with a hose up there. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Mr. Spencer asked you about the floor. Is it ever neces-
sary to wash the bottom of this machine ·here Y 
A. No more than it would be any other piece of furniture 
in your house. You are not supposed to pour 
page 33 } wat~r all over it, but just wash it off. 
Q. You can take out the integral parts of this 
thing and wash them? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. But you don't wash the base· on which it sits? 
A. No, you don't have to do that. 
The witness stands aside. 
AUBREY H. STRAUS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman-: 
Q. Please state your name. 
A. Aubrey H. Straus. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Straus? 
A. Richmond, Virginia. 
Q. Mr. Straus, where were you educated, sir? 
A. Well, University of Richmond and Massachusetts 1Tni-
versity of Technology, University of Michigan and some 
work at other places. 
Q. What character of studies. did you specialize in? 
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A. Bacteriology and Public Health has been my specialty. 
Q. After your graduation from college and research work 
that you did there I wish you \vould please tell us some 
positions that you have held. 
page 34 ~ A. I was City Bacteriologist for Richmond a 
period of about fifteen years but not all of that 
in one stretch. I was associated with Pro-fessor of Bac-
teriology of the Medical College of Virginia from 1919 to 
1923, and Director of Laboratorys for Virginia State :Health 
Department from approximately 1919 to 1928. Since then 
I have been doing private consultation work. 
Q. In Richmond Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Straus, I will ask you this question: Have 
you made an examination of the circumstances and condi-
tions under which 1\{r. Robertson is manufacturing or freezing 
ice creamY 
A. Yes, sir, I have seen his place. 
Q. Briefly, I wish you would tell the Court just what 
you found there. 
A. Well, I found the drug store to he cleanly kept at the 
-time I was there. There was no evidence of any flies though 
the front door is not screened at this time. I found the 
freezer and all the parts of it apparently in perfectly clean 
condition and I found an air-tight freezer which is used 
for the freezing of the mix. 
Q. Are you familiar with the way in which this ice cream 
is frozen? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, I wish you would tell us, from your experience 
and your training in health work, what the possibility, if any, 
of contamination, would be from the time that 
page 35 r mix is put into the freezer until it was ready for 
sale. 
A. Well, the things that we always consider essential in 
the handling of any milk or cream product is the matter of 
how the milk or cream itself is handled in production and 
the conditions under which it is pasteurized. They are the 
most essential things. Of course it must be kept clean and 
free from contamination at all stages. Regarding the part 
of the procedure that ~s carried out at Mr. Robertson's 
Pharmacy, whether that would be termed manufacturing or 
not I am in some doubt, but regarding the freezing at lVfr. 
Robertson's establishment, I would say that the chance}; of 
exposure were reduced to a minimum. The mix cotnes in 
these large cans and is poured into smaller ones, not in the 
part of the store where the customers are or where there 
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would be any more danger, I would say, from respiratory 
contamination than there would be from any place, because 
some individual has got to do the pouring wherever it is 
done. When this mix is poured into the smaller containers 
they are placed and kept in a compartment which apparently 
is well refrigerated, the refrigeration being a very impor-
tant thing. The mix is then poured from the small containers 
of approximately two and a half gallons into the f£eezer. 
The time of pouring through this quite large funnel into 
the freezer,-! didn't see the actual po~ring done or tinied 
because· unfortunately there was no mix at the time,-but 
I don't see how it could exceed one to two minutes, during 
which time there would be a slight exposure to the air of 
. the room. However, the freezer was not located 
page 36 } where there would be any customers or anyone 
else around to cough or sneeze over the mixture, 
and from that standpoint the chance of possible contamina-
tion would seem to be infinitely less than where yon have 
a counter freezer that is open to serve retail cream where 
the customer sits on one side of the counter and the man who 
serves it is on the other, so that I would say, from niy obser-
. vations, that the chance of contamination by air in putting 
the cream into the freezer and taking it out of the freezer 
after it was frozen would be much less than the possible 
chances of contamination in the ordinary retail serving c-f 
cream where the open freezer is on one side of the counter 
and a line of customers are sitting on the other. 
Q. After the mix gets in this counter freezer js there 
any possibility of contamination either by air or by people 
smoking in the room where it is? 
A. No. The freezer seems to be perfectly air-tight nnd 
the only air contamination that I would see could occur is 
when the mix is put into the freezer which is approximntely 
:five quarts and an -equal volume of air that goes into the 
ice cream, so there would be some :five quarts of air to go 
into each batch of ice cream and I would say the nir contmni-
nation is negligible. I might say generally in public health 
work the theory of air contamination has been largely ex-
ploded and very little importance is placed upon it. 
Q. Have you investigated, sir, the question of air contami-
nation with reference to the manufaiCturing or 
page 37 ~ freezing of ice creamY 
A. When the question came up I naturally looked 
up what authorities I could :find on the subject and I only 
found one piece of work, that done by Dr. F. W. Fabian 
at the Michigan State College of Agriculture Experimental 
Station. 
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Q. Do you know anything about Dr. Fabian's standing 1 
A. He i'S a recognized authority on the subject of ice 
cream. sanitation and manufacture. He has written a great 
many articles and in fact on many phases of the subject the 
only articles I was able to find were those written by him. 
Q. Will you tell us without going into any great detail 
what conclusions his studies have led him to with reference 
to air contamination in its relation to the manufacture of ice 
cream or freezing of ice cream 1 
A. I will be glad to quote him, if your Honor wants me to, 
but in brief he simply states it has little or no significance. 
Q. That is a result of experiments and tests 1 
A. Experiments conducted over a long period of time with 
long tables and careful investigation of the subject. 
Q. I wish you would give us the title of that. 
A. The Study of the Significance of Air In Relation To 
Ice Cream. 
Q. Now, as a bacteriologist, did you examine the bac-
teriological content of ice cream which was made at The 
Westover Pharmacy under the circumstances which 
page 38 } have been described here? 
A. Yes, sir, two samples were brought me by 
Mr. Grant Key. I did not collect those samples myself but 
I accepted them from Mr. Key and ran a bacteriological 
count on them. 
Q. Now tell us-I understood from Dr. Perrow-! don't 
mean he minimized the bacteriological content, but I would 
like for you to express an opinion from your study as to what 
the bacteriological content of ice cream has to do with it. -
A. Well, the bacteriological content in ice cream, like the 
bacteria content of milk and butter,-! better stick to milk,-
is one of the criterions by which: we measure sanitary quality. 
It is not, as Dr. Perrow pointed out, the sole criterion, 
but I do think it is a. very important criterion as to the 
quality of ice cream. In a great many States there are 
bacteriological standards that ice cream must come to. There 
is none in VIrginia. 
Q. There is a bacteriological standard with reference to. 
milk in Virginia. 
A. I can't say about the standard in the State of Vir-
ginia. I know there are City standards. I wouldn't be sure 
that there is a State standard. 
Q. Tell us what your experiments disclosed with refer-
ence to the ice cream and how it compared with ice cream 
manufactured commercially. 
page 39 } A. There were two samples submitted, one 
vanilla, which gave a count of five thousand per 
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cubic centimetre which I would say frmn my general knowl-
edge is exceptionally lo,v. The second sample of chocolate,-
I ·might say all flavored ice creams have a tendency to run 
higher than vanilla. The chocolate gave a bacteriological 
count of fifty thousand. I would consider that satisfactory 
and certainly well up to the average commercial ice cream. 
Q. Tell us, if you please, what the standard generally is 
and what the bacteriological content of commercial ice creams 
generally run. 
A. The best State standard, at least the lowest 'bac-
teriological requirement, the lowest number, not in the sense 
of requirements, but a bacterial count of one hundred thou-
sand per c. c. is the best State Standard I know of. That 
is in the State of Michigan. If there are others lower than 
that I don't kno'v of them. I think that is about as low 
as you could expect and both of these samples were well 
below the requirement of any State standard that I am 
familiar with. 
Q. Could you tell me whether or not the floor and the 
smoke alluded to here could have any reasonable relation to 
the manufacture of ice cream under the circumstances we 
are discussing here? 
A. My interpretation of the statute would be that it was 
intended to cov-er a plant where the complete manufacture 
of ice cream takes places. The essential part of pasteuii-
zation and the handling of ice cream in bulk as 
page 40} you get it in any large ice cream manufacturing 
plant or dairy is what I think this statute is in-
tended to cover and in that case I think these standards are 
reasonable because you have your pasteurizing vats which 
are a very vital part of it and you have got the whole process 
going on under one cover. That would correspond more 
to the plant in which this mix is prepared than the place 
where the freezing is merely done. It is extremely doubtful 
in my mind whether the purport of the statute was to coyer 
the incidental process of freezing this ice cream. It would 
seem to me that the whole standard of the law was made 
to apply to the plant where the whole thing was ca.rried 
out, particularly the pasteurization. I didn't answer your 
question specifically. I don't think the floor of the roon1, 
unless it were coated with dust which could be kicked up 
and stirred up, I don't think that the floor could have any 
possible bearing on the freezing of this ice cream, nor do 
I see any possible bearing that the presence of tobacco smoke 
would have. In the first place the smoking is not likely to 
occur in the immediate vicinity of the freezer. The freezer 
is over to one side, not around the counter where the cus-
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tomers are likely to be standing, but even if it were there 
I don't see any bearing. 
Q. What chance, if any, of contamination exists from 
the pouring of the mix from the container into the counter 
freezer? 
page 41 r A. Somebody could come up and cough into it 
if they tried to do it, but that could happen any-
where where you were transferring the mix. If you had an 
attendant who had a streptococcic sore throat and that at-
tendant was taking the ice cream from the freezer to the cans 
he could cough in it. I would say that the chance was no 
greater in one place than in another because the freezer, in 
the first place, is turned away from the store in the other 
direction and casual exposure to air I 'vould consider of no 
significance. I think nothing ~short of direct coughing into 
the 1nixture could be of any importance. 
Q. From your observation of the Westover Pharrp.acy and 
the general construction and makeup could this counter 
freezer be feasibly located anywhere other than where it is 
located now? 
A. I don't think it could. I couldn't really answer that 
question intelligently because I didn't look over the store 
with that in mind at all. 
Q. Could it be located in the basement? 
A. I would consider that a very improper place. 
Q. Why? 
A. In the first place I like to see things out in ·the light 
of day where you can see what you are doing and not in 
some dark back room or basement. I suppose you could 
put an air conditioned air-tight room in the basement. That 
would be a possible thing but I wouldn't consider it desir-
able. 
page 42} CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. Mr. Straus, you say you are now a private consultant 
bacteriologist f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are employed by the Bastian-Blessing Company 
here as an expert witness Y 
A. Mr. Key, the local representative saw me., So far as 
I know my relationship is only with Mr. Key. 
Q. And it was with particular reference to finding whether 
or not this particular counter type freezer was a sanitary 
way of making ice cream, was it not? 
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A. I was asked my opinion and to make laboratory exami-
nation of the ice cream from this freezer. 
Q. You don't know where that ice cream came from Y 
A. No, except from Mr. Key's statement. 
Q. You don't know whether it was specially prepared or 
not? 
A. No, I have no way of testifying as to that. 
Q. Mr. Straus, the legislature must not have consulted 
you- in 1934 when it passed this act. 
A. No, I was not with the State at that time. 
Q. You were not with the State at that time f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You do not regard these provisions of the act as neces-
sary and reasonable provisions to safeguard public health f 
A. One moment now,-in regard to the freezing 
page 43 } process. I question extremely whether the freezing 
process in a type freezer of this sort, which frankly 
I had not seen before,-! don't know how long it has been 
on the market-but I would question very seriously whether 
the purport of the act was intended at all to cover this type 
of operation. 
By the Court : I understand him to say that the provisions 
of the act were probably reasonably applicable to the place 
where this mix was made but that when it came to the process 
of transferring the mix into ice cream he didn't think some 
of these requirements were called for. 
Q. Was that the purport of your testimony? 
A. That was the purport I had in mind. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. It would certainly be a. fact that if this ice cream were 
made in a room with a concrete floor and met the require-
ments of the act the chances of contamination would be 
less than where it is f 
A. The chances of contamination are at such a minimum 
I don't really think it would make any difference. 
Q. It would make no difference? 
A. Practically no difference. _ 
Q. Isn't a drug store usually visited by sick people, peo-
ple with sore throats and what not Y 
A. I don't know. I don't doubt but there may be a few 
more ·sick people possibly· but for that matter air 
page 44 } contamination, Mr. Spencer, has been practically 
thrown out. Dr. "Haffin'' had the courage to put 
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patients of various contagious diseases together with only a 
screen between them and he found no cross infection. 
Q. In other words, the whole theory of air contamination is 
discarded? 
A. Practically discarded. 
The witness stands aside. 
GRANT E. KEY, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. You are a representative of Bastian-Blessing Company 
who manufacture counter freezers? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did you take from the Westover Pharmacy certain 
ice cream frozen in the counter freezer there and give them 
to Mr. Straus here 7 
A. I did, yes, sir. 
Q. Were they regular specimens taken out of the freezer t 
A. Yes, sir. 
By the Court: 
Q. One of vanilla and one of chocolateY 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 45 ~ E. F. COLEMAN, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DffiECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. What are your initials? 
A. E. F. 
Q. With whom are you connected, Mr. Coleman f 
A. Pet Milk Company. 
Q. Where is that located? 
A. Abingdon, Virginia. 
By Mr. Spencer: There is no question about this. It is 
conceded that the Pet Milk Company sends the stuff here 
in absolutely safe condition~ 
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By Mr. Coleman: Very well. I will ask him this one ques-
tion: · 
Q. The nrix, as it is referred to here, is the stuff that is 
put in the machine to freeze, isn't it Y 
A. That is the biggest part of it, yes, sir. 
By the Court : 
Q. I suppose what you add to it is the flavoring. 
A. Flavor and fruit. 
The witness stands aside. 
MR. GRA..t~T E. ICEY (recalled). 
By Mr. Coleman: 
Q. Mr. Key, when was this counter freezer unit first sold 
to the public? 
A. They were :first placed on the market about six years 
ago. During the past three years they have been 
page 46 ~ becoming more and more popular, particularly the 
past two years, and now we sell at about the rate 
of fifty a day. 
By Mr. Spencer: 
Q. And you are trying to sell more by making this test · 
caseY 
A. Yes, sir, I want to sell more of them. 
The witness stands aside. 
End of all testimony. 
page 47 ~ I, Aubrey E. Strode, Judge of the Corporation 
Court ·for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, who 
presided over the foregoing trial of Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia v. F. A. Robertson, in said Court, at Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia, on October 22, 1936, do certify that the foregoing is 
a true and correct copy and report of all of the evidence and 
other incidents of said trial as therein set forth. 
And I do :further certify that the Attorney for the Com-
monwealth has had reasonable notice, in writing, given by 
counsel for the defendant, F. A. Robertson of the time and 
place, when the foregoing report of the testimony and other 
incidents of said trial would be tendered and presented to the 
undersigned for signature and authe~tication. 
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Given under my hand this 17th day of November, 1936, 
within sixty days after the entry of final judgment in this 
cause. 
AUBREY E. STRODE, 
Judge of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg. 
pag.e 48 ~ I, Hubert H. Martin, Clerk of the Corporation 
Court, for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, do 
certify that the foregoing report of the testimony and other 
incidents of the trial of the case of Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia v. F. A. Robertson, which has been duly authenticated 
by the Judge of the said Court, were lodged and filed by me, 
as the Clerk of said Court, on the 17" day of November, 
1936. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, 
Clerk of the Corporation Court for the 
City of Lynchburg. 
page 49 r And now at this day, to-wit, At Lynchburg Cor-
poration Court, Nov. 2nd, 1936, the date first here-
inbefore mentioned. 
This day came the Commonwealth's attorney, and the said 
F. A. Robertson appeared by his attorney, as well as in his 
own proper person in discharge of his recognizance, and the 
evidence and argument of counsel having been heard, and the . 
court having maturely considered of its judgment to be given 
in the premises, doth find the defendant guilty of manufac-
turing ice cream without a permit, as charged, and doth fix 
his punishment at a fine of $10.00. Thereupon the defendant 
by his attorney moved the court to set aside its judgment 
and grant the defendant a new trial, on the ground that said 
judgment is contrary to the law and the evidence, which 
n1otion the court overruled, and the defendant by his attorney. 
excepted. It is therefore considered by the court that the 
said F. A. Robertson forfeit and pay to the Commonwealth 
$10.00, the amount of the fine aforesaid, and that he pay the 
costs of this prosecution. 
At the instance of the defendant by his attorney who in-
timated his intention to apply for a writ of error and s~tper­
sedeas, the court doth order that execution of the foregoing 
judgment be suspended for a period of sixty d;;t.ys ; and the 
defendant's ·recognizance shall remain in full force a~d effect 
until this case is finally disposed of, according to law. 
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page 50~ I, Hubert H. Martin, clerk of the corporation 
court of the city of Lynchburg, do certify that the 
foregoing is a true transcript of the record of the case of 
Commonwealth v. F. A. Robertson, and I further certify that 
notices as required by Section 6253-f and Section 6339 of 
the Code were duly given as appears by a paper writing 
filed with the record of said case. 
The fee for making this transcript is $5.00. 
Given under my hand this 18th day o£ November, 1936. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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